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Abstract 
 
In this article results of the two experiments, aimed at the development 
of the instrument (test) that would enable construction of the 
comprehensive measure of individual overconfidence for the use in 
economic overconfidence experiments, are presented. Instrument was 
obtained in a two-stage procedure. In the first experimental phase, a pilot 
test, consisting of fifty general-knowledge questions of the unknown 
difficulty, was conducted to divide the items into three difficulty levels: 
hard, average-difficulty and easy questions. The second phase was aimed 
at verification of the replicability of results. Statistical tests supported the 
existence of the hard-easy effect, verified the success of categorization of 
questions into three levels of difficulty, and showed that gender was not 
associated with overconfidence in the developed instrument. The average 
group overconfidence measures obtained from both experimental phases 
did not differ from each other significantly. Instrument’s internal 
consistency was found to be good and acceptable for the use in social 
research. Compared to the tests used in the foregoing economic 
experiments, the obtained test is believed to result in the improvement of 
the overconfidence measurement quality.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
A large body of economic literature presents results of experiments on overconfidence. The 
concept of overconfidence is based on the evidence form cognitive psychological research, 
which suggests that human-beings overestimate their knowledge, abilities and precision of 
their information. As example Bar-Hillel (2001) points out that, when subjects are P% sure that 
they have answered a question correctly in fact they are right on average less than P% of the 
time. There is plenty of evidence for people to be in general overconfident, and phenomenon of 
overconfidence has been found in many different samples of the population, e.g. students 
(Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein,1977; Koriat et al., 1980; Zakay and Glicksohn, 1992), 
members of the armed forces (Hazard and Peterson, 1973), CIA analysts (Cambridge and 
Shreckengost, 1978), entrepreneurs (Baron, 2000), clinical psychologists (Oskamp, 1962), 
bankers (Staël von Holstein, 1972), executives (Moore, 1977), negotiators (Neale and 
Bazerman, 1990), managers (Russo and Schoemaker,1992), lawyers (Wagenaar and Keren, 
1986), and civil engineers (Hynes and Vanmarcke, 1976). Overconfidence is already present in 
children (see Powel and Bolich, 1993; Allwood, Granhag, and Jonsson, 2006), and boys are 
found to be more overconfident than girls (e.g. Sieber, 1979; Newman, 1984; Allwood et al., 
2006). However, in adult samples no differences between both genders in overconfidence1 are 
observed (e.g. Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1981; Gigerenzer et al., 1991). 
In economic experiments, there is no conventional method of measurement of the inborn level 
of subjects’ overconfidence. For this purpose various proxies, tests and tasks are used, that not 
always offer a satisfactory measure of individual overconfidence. The need for this research is 
stimulated by the fact that previous experiments have drawbacks in the way they measure 
overconfidence, and thus overconfidence might have been caused (to some extent) by other 
reasons than the imperfection of human nature, but rather by the mistakes in the tests’/ tasks’ 
construction. Findings from psychological research indicate that the observable biases in 
judgment are often result of the inappropriateness of the task, e.g. a task is unclear to subjects, 
one gender finds task more difficult than the other, or there is not enough motivation for 
active participation. Thus development of the overconfidence test was implemented with the 
following assumptions in mind. First of all, most of the foregoing researchers followed the 
famous work by Russo and Schoemaker (1992) and used interval elicitation tasks to assess 
overconfidence. However, these tasks are prone to produce extreme overconfidence (see 
                                                 
1 Assessed via sets of general knowledge questions.  
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Klayman et al., 1999). Second, previous authors used tests that were neither balanced to the 
hard-easy effect nor country or gender balanced. Yet, unbalanced tests can artificially create 
high levels of under- or overconfidence either in the whole group, or in parts of it. Third, 
overconfidence was often assessed based on the insufficient number of assignments or test 
items; psychological studies of overconfidence use amounts of items that are much higher. 
And last but not least, many of the tasks and tests were either not administered, or were not 
(financially) rewarded.  
This paper presents the results of the two experiments, aimed at the development of the 
instrument (test) that would enable construction of a comprehensive measure of individual 
overconfidence for the use in economic overconfidence experiments dealing with: 1) the role 
of overconfidence in occurrence of stock-prices’ bubbles, and 2) impact of overconfidence 
and risk aversion on economic behavior of individual traders. Test is intended for the 
detection of potential experimental subjects with high and low degrees of overconfidence and 
their subsequent grouping into two types of asset markets: rational and overconfident. Hence, 
a well-designed instrument should allow assessment of differences between the subjects with 
respect to their overconfidence and minimize the measurement error.  
The developed test differs from those used in prior economic experiments in some important 
respects. First, another test format was chosen, namely multiple choice discrete propositions’ 
task format, which is clearer to subjects and is not inherently prone to production of extreme 
overconfidence levels. Second, test was balanced to the hard-easy effect, by the inclusion of 
an equal number of questions of three difficulty levels (hard, medium-difficulty and easy). 
Third, in construction of the test it was controlled for the possible country and gender bias, 
e.g. no inclusion of questions that might be easier to one gender. And finally, compared to 
some studies, the test is expanded to include more items. Instrument was obtained in a two-
stage procedure in which a pilot test was used to assess questions’ difficulty, based on the 
group accuracy in answering every item of the 50 initial. Then six questions of each of the 
three difficulty types were chosen for the inclusion in the final test. The second experimental 
phase was aimed at verification of replicability of results, namely of the average degree of 
group overconfidence, the obtained categorization into three difficultly levels and of 
controlling for the gender bias. Both experiments were conducted with the students enrolled 
into different disciplines of social sciences. Experimental sessions were administered and 
subjects were offered a reward, on the basis of competition in test accuracy. The final 
instrument consists of 18 general knowledge questions unrelated to economics, financial 
markets or experiments. Questions are not connected to economics, as otherwise they could 
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cause biased results if the same test is used with a heterogeneous pool of subjects2. Evidence 
was found for the significant effect of the question difficulty on the overconfidence measure 
and existence of the gender bias. Compared to medium and easy questions, which resulted in 
under-confidence, hard questions produced significantly higher levels of overconfidence. The 
three types of questions also significantly varied from each other in terms of the produced 
confidence and accuracy. This result verified the success of categorization of questions into 3 
levels of difficulty in the created overconfidence measurement test. In the initial instrument as 
much as 16% of variance in accuracy and 7% of variance in confidence was explained by 
gender. In the final test gender is not associated with overconfidence, and there is almost no 
variance in confidence and accuracy that is gender dependent.  
Paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 a review of the findings of psychological 
overconfidence literature are presented. In Section 3 findings from the theoretical and 
empirical research on overconfidence in finance are introduced, and ideas, on how 
overconfidence was measured in the previous experimental research, are presented; in closing 
of this Section a problem statement with the ideas about research improvement are provided. 
In Section 4 methodology of the test construction is described. In Section 5 statistical data 
analysis is presented. In Section 6 findings from the experiment with the final overconfidence 
measurement instrument are analyzed, and, finally Section 7 concludes. 
2 OVERCONFIDENCE IN PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 
Our life is full of uncertainty, and many decisions are based on beliefs concerning the 
likelihood of uncertain events (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982). These beliefs can be expressed 
in numerical form as subjective probabilities. Question of generation of these probabilities is 
one of the most important topics in the area of cognitive psychology (Bar-Hillel, 2001). Bar-
Hillel (2001) suggests that subjective probabilities are not just imperfect or inaccurate 
versions of objective probabilities, but rather are governed by cognitive principles of their 
own. To generate subjective probabilities, people rely on a limited number of heuristic 
principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to 
simpler judgmental operations. In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes 
they lead to severe and systematic errors (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982), and thus to non-
optimal judgments (see Russo and Schoemaker, 1992, for the description of the heuristics 
employed by people for assessment of probabilities). Use of heuristics for generation of 
                                                 
2 Deaves et al. (2004) also motivate their choice of non-economic questions by the attempt “to avoid giving 
either group of participants a relative advantage because of subject content”. 
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subjective probabilities is a cognitive cause of overconfidence. Overconfidence is 
characterized by the tendency to overestimate one’s skills, prospects for success, the 
probability of positive outcomes or the accuracy of one’s knowledge, and arises from not 
knowing the limits of one’s knowledge (Conger and Wolstein, 2004). 
2.1 DEFINITION OF THE OVERCONFIDENCE BIAS 
In financial literature there are several findings that are often summarized under the concept 
of overconfidence: miscalibration, the better than average effect, illusion of control, and 
unrealistic optimism. The issue of whether these notions are related is mainly unexplored3 
(Glaser and Weber, 2007). In psychological research, however, only miscalibration is defined 
as overconfidence.  
Miscalibration  
Miscalibration is a cognitive bias that rests on the fact that people tend to overestimate the 
precision of their knowledge. In the experiments on calibration, participants answer a series of 
(general knowledge) questions and stipulate their confidence of being correct for each answer. 
Calibration is tested by comparing the percentage of questions that a participant has answered 
correctly with the participant’s average confidence in the answers to these questions. 
Individuals are considered to be well calibrated if the following condition is satisfied: over the 
long run of those responses made with confidence P, about P% should be correct (Adams, 
1957). However most of the people are not well-calibrated and demonstrate overconfidence 
(miscalibration), which manifests itself through a systematic deviation from perfect 
calibration and is defined as an “unwarranted belief in the correctness of one’s answer” 
(Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips, 1977). Typically, for all questions the proportion of 
correct answers is lower than the assigned probability (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips, 
1982). In a second strand of psychological literature, where overconfidence is measured by 
asking subjects to state for a series of questions with unknown numerical answer an upper and 
lower limit such that a subject is X% sure that the real answer would fall into that interval, the 
usual finding is that subjects’ probability distributions are too tight (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, 
and Phillips, 1982). E.g. when subjects are asked to state 90% confidence intervals for some 
uncertain quantity, the percentage of true values that fall outside the interval, is higher than 
10% (the percentage of surprises of a perfectly calibrated person). In the study of Alpert and 
                                                 
3 Oberlechner and Osler (2003), Glaser, Langer, and Weber (2005), Glaser and Weber (2007) found no 
significant correlation between miscalibration and better than average effect measures.  
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Raiffa (1982) 50% intervals included the true quantity only about 30% of the time; 98% 
intervals included the true quantity only about 60% of the time. 
Better than average effect  
Inclination of people to exaggeration of their talents embodies itself in the better than average 
effect. Taylor and Brown (1988) document in their survey that people have unrealistically 
positive views of the self, i.e. they think about themselves as possessing above the average 
abilities (e.g. with regard to skills or positive personal traits) compared to other people. One 
of the most cited works by Svenson (1981) states that 82 percent of a group of students rank 
themselves among the 30 percent of drivers with the highest driving safety. Sümer et al. (2006) 
also found better than average effect among drivers in their sample, resulting from exaggerated ratings of self-reported 
driving skills. 
Illusion of control and unrealistic optimism 
Illusion of control is linked to the exaggeration of the degree to which one can control one’s 
fate. Subjects prone to the illusion of control, tend to underestimate the role of chance in 
human affairs and to misperceive games of chance as games of skill (Kahneman and Riepe, 
1998). Langer (1975) in her pioneering work defines this phenomenon as “an expectancy of a 
personal success probability inappropriately higher than the objective probability would 
warrant”. The phenomenon of unrealistic optimism about future life events is a cognitive bias 
that is strongly related to the illusion of control (Weinstein, 1980). Johnson, McDermott, Barrett, 
Cowden, Wrangham, McIntyre, and Rosen (2006) point out that numerous empirical findings confirm “that mentally 
healthy people tend to exhibit psychological biases that encourage optimism, collectively known as “positive 
illusions”. According to Kahneman and Riepe (1998) “most people’s beliefs are biased in the 
direction of optimism”. Griffin and Brenner (2005) note, that “optimistic overconfidence” 
represents overestimation of the probabilities of the events that are advantageous to the 
subject. Probabilities of the unfavorable events are underestimated by optimists; even in cases 
when they have no control over them, e.g. Kahneman and Riepe (1998) note “most 
undergraduates believe that they are less likely than their roommates to develop cancer or to 
have a heart attack before the age of fifty”.  
2.2 MEASUREMENT OF OVERCONFIDENCE  
There are two types of calibration assessment techniques used in the psychological 
experiments: making probability judgments about discrete propositions, and the calibration of 
probability density functions assessed for uncertain numerical quantities (the fractile method). 
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Measurement of Calibration with Discrete Propositions’ Task  
To measure overconfidence with the discrete propositions, subjects are suggested to answer a 
series of questions and state their confidence for each question that their answer was correct. 
Discrete propositions can give no alternatives for an answer, or suggest one, two, or multiple 
answer choices.  
Calibration can be expressed through several various measures (e.g. Calibration curve, Brier 
score). However a convenient measure, enabling discrimination between under- and 
overconfidence, is the bias score. The bias score is calculated as the difference between the 
average confidence level across all questions and the proportion of correct answers. A 
positive bias score represents overconfidence, and a negative bias score represents 
underconfidence. A bias score of zero indicates an accurately calibrated (neutral) person. 
bias score = average % confidence – average % correct      (1) 
Or as in Pulford (1996): 
1
1
/ ( )
T
t t t
t
over underconfidence n r c
N =
= −∑       (2) 
Here, T is the total number of response categories used, nt is the number of times the response 
rt was used and ct is the proportion correct for all items assigned probability rt.  
Measurement of Calibration with the Fractile Method 
Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips (1982) note that uncertainty about the value of an 
unknown continuous quantity (e.g. what is the air distance from London to Tokyo) “may be 
expressed as probability density function across the possible values of that quantity”. The 
assessor has to state values of the uncertain quantity that are associated with a small number 
of predetermined fractiles (quantiles) of the distribution, i.e., as mentioned before, to state, for 
a series of questions with unknown numerical answer, upper and lower limits such that she is 
X% sure that the real answer would fall into that interval. There are two calibration measures 
for continuous items: interquartile index and surprise index. Interquartile index is the 
percentage of items for which the true value falls inside the interquartile range (i.e., between 
the 0.25 and 0.75 fractiles) (Lichtenstein et al., 1982). Interquartile index of a perfectly 
calibrated person is 0.5. Surprise index is the percentage of true values that falls outside the 
most extreme fractiles assessed. Lichtenstein et al. (1982) write that when the most extreme 
fractiles are assessed as 0.01 and 0.99, the surprise index of the perfectly calibrated person 
should be 2. Large surprise index shows the inability of the assessor to state confidence 
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bounds wide enough to include as much as possible of the true values. This indicates 
overconfidence.  
2.2 FACTORS INFLUENCING THE DEGREE OF OVERCONFIDENCE  
Keasey and Watson (1989) identified four factors that have an impact on the accuracy-
confidence relationship: task complexity, amount of feedback, subjects’ level of motivation, 
and their skills.  
Hard-Easy Effect  
The degree of overconfidence is connected to the complexity of the task. This is called the 
“had-easy” effect. This effect occurs when the degree of overconfidence increases with the 
increase in the difficulty of the questions, where difficulty is measured as the percentage of 
correct answers (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, and Kleinbölting, 1991). Lichtenstein et al. (1982) 
suggest that “the most pervasive finding in recent research is that people are overconfident 
with general-knowledge items of moderate or extreme difficulty”. Many studies have 
supported this conclusion, e.g. Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein (1977), Koriat, Lichtenstein 
and Fischhoff (1980), Nickerson and McGoldrick (1965), Cambridge and Shreckengost 
(1978), Arkes, Christensen, Lai, and Blumer, (1987), Ronis and Yates, (1987), Sniezek, 
Paese, and Switzer, (1990) and etc. The degree of overconfidence is the highest with the tasks 
of high difficulty (e.g. Clarke, 1960; and Pitz, 1974); as tasks get easier, overconfidence is 
reduced (Lichtenstein et al., 1982).  
Motivation and Feedback 
The two ways of increasing subjects’ calibration are: motivation through reward for their 
assessment to be more precise, and outcome feedback (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips, 
1982).  
Motivation, according to Bohner et al. (1998) is one of the factors that encourage people to 
abandon the use of effort minimizing heuristics in favor of more effortful probabilities’ 
estimation strategies; thus it has an impact on the accuracy-confidence relationship. 
Motivation through reward is named to be a tool, helping to improve subjects’ calibration, by 
Lichtenstein et al. (1982). This finding is supported by the paper of Hoelzl et al. (2005) who 
have discovered a significant change in overconfidence pattern depending on the existence or 
nonexistence of the monetary reward.  
Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips (1982) state, that receiving outcome feedback after every 
assessment is the best condition for successful training to be better calibrated. Adams and 
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Adams (1958) have found modest improvement in subjects’ calibration after five training 
sessions where they were given feedback on their performance. Fischfoff (1982) reports some 
successful training exercises, mostly using large amounts of well-structured feedback. 
Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1980) studied the impact of extensive, personalized calibration 
feedback on two groups of subjects. Perceptible improvement in calibration was reported, 
however no improvement was found in probabilities’ assessment by fractile method. In 
general, improvement in the accuracy of estimates is difficult to achieve (see e.g. Ferrell and 
McGoey, 1980; Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1980; Koriat et al., 1980), and there are reasons to 
be pessimistic about how well training transfers across time or tasks (Camerer, 1995). 
3 OVERCONFIDENCE IN FINANCIAL LITERATURE 
3.1 FINDINGS FROM THE RESEARCH 
Following psychological research in overconfidence, interest in the consequences of 
economic subjects’ overconfidence on financial decision making, functioning of markets and 
economic outcomes has occurred in behavioral economics. Findings of behavioral finance 
have an important value in understanding various anomalies and stylized facts found for 
example in the stock market. Overconfidence research in economics is developing in two 
directions: theoretical modeling and empirical testing of these models.  
Theoretical models about the impact of overconfidence on the processes in financial markets 
and the behavior of investors are based on the initial assumption of traders’ overconfidence, 
whose decision-making is modeled according to this premise. Behavioral finance models 
predict that overconfidence causes excess trading volume (De Bondt and Thaler, 1984; 
Shiller, 2000; Benos, 1998; Caballé and Sákovics, 2003), and excess price volatility 
(Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003; Benos, 1998, Daniel et al., 1998); it induces occurrence of the 
speculative price bubbles (Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003) and increases the market depth 
(Odean, 1999; Kyle and Wang, 1997; Benos, 1998); it makes markets underreact to abstract, 
statistical, and highly relevant information and overreact to salient, but less relevant 
information (Odean, 1998); it makes returns of financial assets predictable (Daniel et al., 
1998, 2001; Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003). Overconfidence increases investors’ tendency to 
herd (Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam and Titman, 1994) and makes them choose riskier and 
undiversified portfolios (Odean, 1998, 1999; Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1992), 
overconfident investors trade more aggressively, i.e. their trading activity is too high (Odean, 
1999; Gervais and Odean, 2001) and their expected utility is reduced (De Long et al., 1991; 
Odean, 1998). 
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There are not so many empirical and experimental studies testing the assumptions of the 
abovementioned theories of the impact of overconfidence on financial decision making, 
functioning of the markets and economic outcomes. Empirical findings support the premise of 
theoretical models, that overconfidence results in high trading volume in the market (Statman, 
Thorley, and Vorkink, 2006; Kim and Nofsinger, 2003); it also increases the probability of 
bubbles’ occurrence4 (Oechssler, Schmidt and Schnedler, 2007). A higher degree of 
overconfidence reduces traders’ performance/ welfare (Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2003; Biais, 
Hilton, Mazurier, and Pouget, 2005; Odean, 1999; Barber and Odean, 2002; Nöth and Weber, 
2003), and causes mistakes in financial decision making (Biais et al., 2005); unrealistically 
positive self-evaluation increases trading volume (Glaser and Weber, 2007). There is no clear 
conclusion about how overconfidence may influence markets’ reaction to new information: 
e.g. Loughran and Ritter (1995) found that markets overreact to new information, and studies 
by Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990), Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995) detected 
underreaction. There is no clear relationship between the degree of overconfidence, and the 
degree of professionalism: in the studies by Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) and Glaser and 
Weber (2007) overconfidence increases with experience, whereas studies of Menkhoff, 
Schmeling, and Schmidt (2006) and Biais et al. (2005) find the reverse dependence.  
3.2 MEASUREMENT OF OVERCONFIDENCE IN EMPIRICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL 
STUDIES 
As mentioned above, there are a few empirical and experimental studies designed to test the 
impact of overconfidence on financial decisions, market outcomes and subjects’ performance. 
Some of them present only an indirect evidence of such impact, as they measure 
overconfidence via various proxies and it is not always clear who of the subjects and how 
strong are overconfident. Other studies measure the inborn level of subjects’ overconfidence 
via the different tasks and tests, related or non-related to economics and finance. Such tests 
usually enable construction of the overconfidence measure for each individual. Most often 
these tasks are related to confidence intervals’ estimations in the spirit of the work by Russo 
and Shoemaker (1992). 
Proxies for Overconfidence 
Papers that use proxies for overconfidence do not allow for the numerical measurement of the 
degree of overconfidence. E.g. Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) test the hypothesis of 
                                                 
4 Top-rank belief variable “has a positive and significant effect on the probability of bubbles” (Oechssler et al., 
2007). 
 11 
interdependence of overconfidence and high trading volume for the USA stock market. As a 
proxy for the degree of overconfidence authors suggest using high past returns. They argue 
that after high past returns posterior volume of trade will be higher, as successful investment 
increases the degree of overconfidence. The same proxy for overconfidence (i.e. high past 
returns) was utilized by Kim and Nofsinger (2003) for the Japanese stock market.  
Barber and Odean (2001) use gender of the trader as a proxy for overconfidence. Their 
assumption is that, based on the psychological literature, women are less overconfident than 
men, thus they are going to trade less than men. In their study men are actually found to trade 
more than women. In another paper Barber and Odean (2002) employ as a proxy of 
overconfidence changes in the trading patterns and performance of the 1607 investors who 
switched from the phone-based trading to online trading between 1992 and 1995. They 
present evidence that these investors traded more actively and speculatively, and performed 
subpar.  
Blavatsky (2008) measures overconfidence by the taken choice in a simple task: subjects can 
either bet on their knowledge or on the equivalent lottery. Those who choose an option to bet 
on their own knowledge are classified to be overconfident (others are underconfident). Under 
this measurement procedure, subjects, on average, exhibit underconfidence about their own 
knowledge, and their confidence does not depend on their attitude towards risk/ ambiguity. 
Overconfidence Measured via Tests and Tasks 
In comparison to the studies that use various proxies to measure overconfidence, 
questionnaire studies enable direct assessment of each subject’s under- or overconfidence.  
Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) investigate overconfidence within the context of an 
experimental asset market. Miscalibration of subjects is measured before each trading period, 
with the help of the two price prediction tasks: point prediction with the confidence in 
forecast, and 98% confidence interval prediction. Results presented in their paper indicate that 
in some periods participants demonstrate overconfidence and in others underconfidence, thus 
they are not generally prone to overconfidence. Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) also show 
that higher degree of overconfidence is negatively correlated with the earnings of the 
participants of their experiment. 
Fenton-O’creevy, Nicholson, Soane, and Willman (2003) examine the impact of illusion of 
control on the performance of traders in four investment banks. They use a computer-based 
task measurement of the illusion of control to execute measurement of overconfidence: 107 
participants had to raise an index on the computer screen by pressing keyboard-buttons and 
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rate their success in doing so from 1 (not at all successful) to 100 (very successful). The index 
in reality was modeled as random walk process with an upward trend, and thus the button had 
no influence on its development.  
Biais, Hilton, Mazurier, and Pouget (2005) conduct an experiment to check if overconfidence 
has impact on subjects’ trading performance (trading activity and profits). They use the scale 
adapted from Russo and Schoemaker (1992) to measure the degree of overconfidence in a 
group of 245 students. Their test consisted of 10 general-knowledge questions with known 
numerical answers for which subjects had to state 90% confidence intervals. Several weeks 
later, after the students’ overconfidence was measured, they participated in the experimental 
asset market. Questions that were used to measure subject’s miscalibration had nothing to do 
with financial markets, yet they affected strategies and performance in the experimental 
market; this points at the robustness of the psychological construct independent of the context 
in which the questions are asked (Biais et al., 2005). 
In their stock market experiment Deaves, Lüders, and Luo (2004) are testing for premises that 
overconfidence leads to an increase in trading activity, and that gender influences trading 
activity through differences in overconfidence. They measure overconfidence of their subjects 
using a calibration based approach prior to conducting the experiment. Compared to the tests 
used in the other studies, their test contains more (up to 20) items. Each of the general 
knowledge questions in their test had a known numerical answer for which subjects had to 
state upper and lower bounds of 90% confidence interval in which the real answer would fall. 
Their choice of the non-economic questions is motivated by the attempt to avoid giving either 
group of participants a relative advantage because of subject content (Deaves et al., 2009).  
Stotz and von Nitzsch (2005) in their paper investigate the extent of analyst overconfidence in 
their abilities to forecast prices and earnings. 112 bank analysts had to answer two questions: 
one asked them to rank their skills with regard to their price or earnings estimates in 
comparison to their colleagues, and another asked to estimate what percentage of analysts 
produce work superior/ inferior to them. Two types of coefficients, measuring subjects’ 
overconfidence, were then calculated: overconfidence coefficients for earnings and in price 
targets. Results presented in their paper suggest, that overconfidence increases with an 
increasing perception of control. 
Glaser and Weber (2007) asked a sample of approximately 3000 individual investors with 
online broker accounts to answer an online test, which enabled the authors to measure several 
manifestations of overconfidence: miscalibration, better than average effect, illusion of 
control, and unrealistic optimism. To measure miscalibration they asked subjects to state 
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upper and lower bounds of 90% confidence interval to the five economy-related questions5 
and five stock price predictions. Only 114 investors answered all their economy-related 
questions, and 165 – stock price prediction questions. By correlation the obtained measures of 
overconfidence and trading volume Glaser and Weber (2007) explored the connection 
between them.  
Glaser, Langer, and Weber (2005) surveyed 123 professional traders and investment bankers, 
and compared results to a student control group in order to analyze whether professionals are 
prone to judgmental biases to the same degree as lay men. They measured overconfidence of 
their subjects by the means of four tasks: 1) subjects stated 90% confidence intervals for 20 
knowledge questions (ten general knowledge and ten economics and finance knowledge); 2) 
subjects had to assess their performance in the knowledge task (how many right answers?) 
and assess own performance compared to others (how many right answers compared to the 
others?); 3) make 15 stock market forecasts by stating 90% confidence intervals, and 4) 
predict a trend in stock prices forecasting via confidence intervals. In most tasks the degree of 
overconfidence of professionals was significantly higher than of the student group. 
To analyze the effect of professionalism on investment decisions Menkhoff, Schmeling, and 
Schmidt (2006) conducted a survey of approximately 500 subjects, consisting of professionals 
and lay men. Alongside with other aspects in their survey, they measured overconfidence via 
two questions on the “appropriate self-evaluation” (in other words better than average effect) 
in which subjects had to estimate their performance and information compared to the other 
investors. They find that, among other control variables, portfolio turnover is related to lower 
risk aversion and higher overconfidence. 
Menkhoff, Schmidt and Brozynski (2006) surveyed 117 fund managers in order to detect an 
impact of experience on overconfidence, risk taking, and herding behavior. Their survey 
measures overconfidence via three tasks that enable assessment of the three manifestations of 
overconfidence: 1) evaluation of the own performance compared to the other fund managers 
(better than average effect), 2) 90% confidence estimation of the DAX index forecast 
(miscalibration), and 3) a third task is aimed at measurement subjects’ illusion of control 
(subjects are asked to rate the statement: economic news are not surprising to me). They find 
that experienced fund managers tend to exhibit herding behavior to a lesser extent than 
inexperienced ones; while evidence concerning the impact of experience on risk taking and 
                                                 
5 However they call them “general knowledge” questions.  
 14 
overconfidence is mixed: positive-self evaluation and illusion of control are increasing with 
experience, whereas miscalibration on the contrary decreases. 
In their paper Oechssler, Schmidt, and Schnedler (2007) study whether bubbles can occur in 
the experimental markets that pay no dividends on assets. To measure overconfidence in their 
experiment they asked subjects, prior to each round, to rank themselves among the 60 subjects 
of a treatment in terms of payoff of that round. For each period the percentage of subjects who 
ranked themselves to be better than median (rank 30 or higher) was compared to the expected 
number of 50%. Overconfidence in their experiment was modest as merely 54% of the 
subjects thought to be better than the median. They have also constructed a second variable – 
“top-rank belief” – that measured, for each round, the number of subjects who thought they 
would be the best in terms of payoff. This construct has positive and significant effect on the 
probability of bubbles’ occurrence in their experimental market. 
3.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
This paper is aimed at the development of the instrument (test) that would enable construction 
of the comprehensive measure of individual overconfidence for the use in two economic 
experiments dealing with: 1) the role of overconfidence in occurrence of stock-prices’ 
bubbles, and 2) impact of overconfidence and risk aversion on economic behavior of 
individual traders. A well-designed instrument will allow assessing differences of the subjects 
with respect to their overconfidence and minimize the measurement error.  
In my opinion previous works have drawbacks in the way they measure overconfidence, and 
thus in prior experiments overconfidence might have been caused (to some extent) by other 
reasons than the imperfection of human nature, i.e. by the mistakes in the tests’/ tasks’ 
construction6. Thus development of the overconfidence test was conducted with the following 
assumptions in mind: 
From the review above one can see that overconfidence in financial settings is estimated 
either with the help of some assignments (e.g. estimate what percentage of analysts produce 
work superior to you?) or by the means of interval elicitation tests. However, overconfidence 
is often assessed based on the insufficient number of assignments or test items. Thus it raises 
doubts that these instruments actually offer a comprehensive measure of overconfidence of an 
individual. This fact is mentioned in the work of Menkhoff et al. (2006), who measured 
overconfidence with three assignments; Barber and Odean (2002) use only two assignments. 
                                                 
6 Not to mention the studies in which overconfidence was never measured directly. For a review see Glaser and 
Weber (2007). 
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In comparison, the psychological studies of overconfidence use the amount of items that is 
much higher, and the minimum number of items for a reliable test is ten (Kline, 1993).  
Most of the foregoing researchers followed the famous work by Russo and Schoemaker 
(1992) and used interval elicitation tests to assess overconfidence. However, interval 
estimation tasks are prone to produce extreme overconfidence (see e.g. Klayman et al., 1999). 
One reason to that is that subjects do not really understand the nature of these intervals and 
“what they are being asked to come up with” (Deaves et al, 2004). Also use of these instruments 
to measure the improvements in calibration, when the test is conducted before and after the 
experiment, is useless as this method does not allow for the improvement in calibration after 
training sessions; on the other hand subjective probability elicitation for the discrete items, 
combined with financial reward, can be improved (Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1980).  
Findings from psychological research show that overconfidence is the most pronounced for 
the hard questions (few people know the right answer) and the least pronounced for the easy 
ones (most of the people know the correct answer). However, the abovementioned papers did 
not make use of the balanced to hard-easy effect tests. This could have artificially created 
high levels of under- or overconfidence, e.g. in the experiment of Deaves et al. (2009) none of 
the subjects got close to the perfect calibration measure, and even the best calibrated 
participants exhibited rather high degrees of overconfidence.  
Connected to the hard-easy effect are country and gender biases. Country bias rests on the 
fact, that some questions might be easy in one country, but in another one they might be hard. 
Gender bias is produced by the choice of questions for the test that could be easier for men 
than women (e.g. sports, masculine hobbies) and vice versa. This could result in the 
inappropriate levels of under- or overconfidence for one gender compared to the other, or in 
one country compared to the other. Nevertheless, previous authors used tests that were not 
country or gender balanced, e.g. Deaves et al. (2009), used the same test in several locations. 
Finally, many of the tasks and tests discussed above were either not administered (e.g. Glaser 
and Weber (2007) conducted their survey via internet, and subjects might have used other 
sources than their own knowledge for answering the test), or were not (financially) rewarded.  
Based on the abovementioned analysis, the developed instrument for measurement of 
overconfidence in the planned stock market experiments will differ in some important 
respects. First, another test format is chosen, namely multiple choice discrete propositions’ 
task format, which, due to its simplicity, is clearer to subjects and not inherently prone to 
production of extreme overconfidence levels. Second, a pilot test is conducted to assess 
questions’ difficulty and to single out easy, medium and hard questions. Then an equal 
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number of questions of the three difficulty levels are included in the final test. Third, in 
construction of the test it is controlled for possible country and gender biases, e.g. I have tried 
to avoid questions that might be easier to one gender than the other. Forth, to check if the 
categorization into three difficultly levels and controlling for gender bias is successful, final 
instrument is pre-tested with the target group of students, namely those who are enrolled in 
different disciplines of the social sciences. Fifth, overconfidence measurement phase of the 
experiment is administered and financially rewarded. Moreover it is rewarded on the 
competition in the test accuracy basis, which should discourage sharing the results among 
students and thus increase the reliability of the measurement. And finally, compared to some 
of the authors, my test is expanded to include more questions.  
4 METHOD 
Procedure and Subjects 
A pilot test, whose purpose was to select questions for the final questionnaire, was conducted 
on the 19th May, 2008 at Christian-Albrechts University of Kiel. Subjects were given 
approximately 30 minutes time to fill in the 50 questions test at the end of the lecture on 
Social Politics. Three monetary prizes were offered for those participants who got the most 
questions right. A reward on the basis of competition in test accuracy was chosen in order to 
decrease the desire of subjects to share answers, and thus increase reliability of the obtained 
individual bias scores. Only fully completed tests were considered for the prize. A total of 96 
tests were completed, of them 44 by males, and 52 by females. Most of the students were 
German (91 subjects). After the initial analysis 12 partially incomplete tests were not included 
in the further analysis. From the remaining 84 tests 50 were chosen randomly – 25 of men, 
and 25 of women. Participants of the test aged from 20 to 29 years (M = 24.32, SD = 0.31), 
and have studied from 3 to 11 semesters (M = 6.98, SD = 2.11). All participants were students 
of social sciences; of them 40% studied management, 38% were economics students, and 22% 
subjects were enrolled into other social studies. Average age of male subjects was 24.48 years 
(SD = 2.43), and their average duration of study was 7 semesters (SD = 2.27). Average age of 
female subjects was 24.16 years (SD = 1.97), and their average duration of study was 6.96 
semesters (SD = 1.99). For information about participants’ age and duration of studies refer to 
Appendix D.  
Design and Materials 
For the pilot test 50 general knowledge questions were selected from the German quiz web-
page http://wissen.de. Questions on this web page have four short (one or two-word) multiple 
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exclusive answers. In the test, only three possible answers to each question were left, as one 
of the choices would usually be clearly incorrect. In choosing test questions I have tried to 
avoid the gender bias, which could result in inappropriate levels of under- or overconfidence 
for one gender, i.e. no questions that could be easier for men than women (e.g. sports, 
masculine hobbies) and vice versa were chosen. In the test students were asked to answer 
each of the 50 questions, and state their level of confidence in the correctness of their answer. 
Any number between 33% and 100% could be used to express subjects’ confidence, where 
33% meant that subjects did not know the correct answer, and were guessing, and 100% 
corresponded to being absolutely certain that the answer was correct.  
In addition to measuring how well the subjects were calibrated, some personal data were 
collected: name, age, educational background, duration of studies, and nationality. In the final 
test students could also mark if they wanted to take part in the further experiments and, if 
answer was positive, submit their email. At the beginning of the pilot participants were 
informed that their personal data would be treated confidentially, and their identities would be 
used by the experimenter only for the purposes of determining the three winners. Thus, 
subjects’ identity was revealed to other students only in the case of being one of the winners of 
the quiz, which was an honor to students. Test’s instructions and design are based on the 
samples that were obtained from Dr. Briony Pulford (University of Leicester, School of 
Psychology) and Dr. Sabina Kleitman (University of Sidney, School of Psychology). 
Based on the analysis of the pilot-test outcomes, a final test (test-18) was constructed from the 
18 questions of the three difficulty levels: six hard, six medium difficulty, and six easy 
questions. Items were differentiated according to their difficulty on the basis of the number of 
correct answers to each of them from the whole group that participated in the pilot study. This 
methodology is described in the article of Pulford and Colman (1997), who suggest assigning 
questions to three difficulty categories, based on the total accuracy of the group in answering 
each question: 0-33% accuracy - hard questions, 34-66% - moderate difficulty, 67-100% easy 
questions. After the initial division, four questions have fallen in the category of hard 
questions (average accuracy 17.5%), 10 questions into category of medium difficulty 
questions (average accuracy 55.2%), and 36 of 50 questions turned to be easy (average 
accuracy 88.5%). As the category of hard-questions had not enough items, based on the idea 
that overconfidence is the most pronounced for hard questions (see Clarke, 1960; and Pitz, 
1974), average overconfidence ratio over each of the medium difficulty questions was 
calculated and the two, having the highest overconfidence coefficient, were chosen to be 
included into hard-questions category. Thus six hard questions rather than four were obtained. 
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Characteristics of the final test in terms of the confidence, accuracy and the bias score are 
presented in the Table 1. Translation of test-18 and instructions are included in Appendix H. 
Table 1: Average confidence, accuracy and bias score for the three levels of question 
difficulty of the final overconfidence test (test-18) 
Hard Medium Easy   
  M SD. M SD M SD 
Confidence 67.90 6.64 65.01 9.01 97.43 2.12 
Accuracy 26.00 16.00 62.33 2.34 100.00 0.00 
Overconfidence 41.90 18.24 2.68 7.48 -2.57 2.12 
5 RESULTS 
Consistent with previous research, on average, subjects have proved to be overconfident: the 
bias score of the group on the test-50 pointed at slight overconfidence (M = 4.47, SD = 7.34); 
recalculation of the bias score for the test-187 has increased the average overconfidence 
measure (M = 14.11, SD = 10.63). Appendix F presents data on the bias score and accuracy of 
all participants who took part in the pilot test for both test-50 and test-18, and men and 
women separately. Average overconfidence of men for test-50 is 3.33 (SD = 5.96), and for 
test-18 it is 14.11 (SD = 10.70). Average overconfidence of women for test-50 is 5.63 (SD = 
8.47), and for test-18 it is 14.12 (SD = 10.79). Noteworthy is the fact, that whereas for the 
complete test-50 average overconfidence of men was slightly lower than that of women, after 
recalculating the overconfidence ratio for the questions chosen to comprise the final test (test-
18), average bias score for both groups practically equalized. For the test-50 correlation 
between accuracy and the bias score is found to be strong and significant, pointing at the 
decrease in overconfidence with the increase in accuracy (Pearson correlation (48) = -0.629, p < 
0.01, one-sided); for the test-18 this relationship is even stronger (Pearson correlation (48) = -
0.823, p < 0.01, one-sided).  
Overconfidence and experience 
After obtaining the bias score for each individual participant of the pilot test, a check of the 
proposition that overconfidence of subjects changes with experience was conducted. The two 
                                                 
7 Same subjects. 
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variables that were used as a proxy of subjects’ experience are age and duration of study at the 
university, measured in semesters. From the graphical analysis of the scatterplots (Appendix 
B) no conclusions about linear relationship between the measures of experience and the bias 
score could be drawn for both test-50 and test-18. Pearson’s correlation analysis also has not 
detected any significant linear relationship between the variables of interest (see Appendix C). 
Based on these findings, I conclude that students of different age groups and being at different 
levels of progress with their studies can be recruited for the participation at the planned 
economic experiment. 
Test-50 vs. Test-18: Accuracy and Confidence  
Analysis of the accuracy of the group for test-50 revealed that even 72% of the questions have 
fallen in the category of easy questions (67-100% accuracy). See Figure 1(a). This test is 
distinguished by high precision, and inadequate to that precision confidence, consequently 
58% of questions resulted in average underconfidence (see Figure 1(b). Appendix A (a) 
confirms, that the distribution of accuracy per question for the test-50 has more mass on the 
right tail (skewness = -1.31), and the distribution of overconfidence per question is left-
skewed (skewness = 1.86). This example illustrates the dangers of using the unbalanced to 
hard-easy effect test in economic research: by using test-50 one can artificially create high 
levels of underconfidence in ones subjects8.  
a.        b. 
Figure 1: Distribution of accuracy (a) and overconfidence per question (b) in test-50 
                                                 
8 Tests skewed in the direction of hard questions, can artificially create group overconfidence. 
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a.                                                                            b. 
Figure 2: Distribution of the bias score of participants per test: a. test-50 and b. test-18 
24% of subjects who completed test-50 were found to be underconfident (see Figure 2(a); for 
test-18 this number decreases to 8% (see Figure 2(b). Alongside with the decrease in the 
percentage of underconfident subjects, an increase in the range of the bias score of the 
participants is observed (from 38.60 to 47.23). There is also improvement in the symmetry of 
the distribution of the bias score (test-50: skewness = 0.73; test-18: skewness = 0.53). See 
Appendix A (b). The increase in bias score range is important for the future experiments as it 
leaves more room for finding subjects whose degree of overconfidence differs significantly. 
5.1 STATISTICAL TESTS  
In this section results of the statistical tests are presented that verify the success of 
categorization of the questions into three levels of difficulty for the test-18, and provide a 
sufficient basis to conclude that overconfidence is a robust phenomenon and not an artifact 
(Bar-Tal et al., 2001). 
Confidence 
I start by analyzing differences in the confidence levels of the subjects for the three difficulty 
levels of questions. On average subjects had the highest confidence for answering easy 
questions – 97.43%; the average confidence level for the hard questions was 67.90%, and for 
the medium questions – 65.01%. The performed Kruskal-Wallis H Test showed that the three 
levels of question difficulty resulted in significantly different from each other confidence 
levels (Chi-square(2) = 11.617, p < 0.01), pointing out, that at least two of the three difficulty 
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levels were characterized by unequal confidence levels. Effect size is η2 = 0.856, which 
means that 86% of the variance in the confidence assessments is due to the difficulty of the 
questions. Pairwise Mann-Whitney U tests revealed that there is no significant difference in 
the confidence for the medium and hard questions (U = 13.500, p = 0.470, two-sided); 
confidence in answering easy questions is significantly higher than in answering medium (U 
= 0.00, p < 0.01, one-sided) and hard questions (U = 0.00, p < 0.01, one-sided).  
Accuracy 
Average accuracy levels for the test-18 were: 26% for hard questions, 62.33% for medium, 
and 100% for easy questions. Kruskal-Wallis H Test indicates that the difficulty level of 
questions significantly affected accuracy of the answers (Chi-Square (2) = 15.760, p < 0.001, 
two-sided); effect size is η2 = 0.926. A series of Mann Whitney U tests were carried out. 
These tests show that there is a significant difference in accuracy for answering three 
categories of questions: medium questions tend to outperform in accuracy hard questions (U = 
0.00, p < 0.01, one-sided); accuracy for answering easy questions significantly exceeds the 
accuracy of medium (U = 0.00, p < 0.01, one-sided), and hard questions (U = 0.00, p < 0.01, 
one-sided). These results prove that the division of questions into three difficulty levels is 
successful. 
Overconfidence 
Table 1 demonstrates that participants exhibit overconfidence for two levels of question 
difficulty (hard questions: BS = 41.90; medium questions: BS = 2.68) and underconfidence for 
the third one (easy questions: BS = -2.57). This is in line with the previous research that found 
hard questions to be the most prone to overconfidence, and easy questions to be often subject to 
underconfidence. The bias scores for easy and hard questions differ significantly from zero 
(easy questions: Wilcoxon signed rank test T = 2.097, p < 0.05, two-sided; hard questions: 
Wilcoxon T = 2.097, p <0.05, two-sided). However, for the medium difficulty questions the null 
hypothesis of the equality of the bias score to zero cannot be rejected (Wilcoxon T = 0.419, p = 
0.675, two-sided). It can be concluded that the medium difficulty questions produced on 
average the bias score which was the most indistinguishable from the perfect calibration score 
of zero. To examine the existence of the hard-easy effect I first test a joint hypothesis of the 
equality of the levels of overconfidence generated by three levels of questions’ difficulty versus 
the alternative, that some difficulty levels produced more overconfidence than the others. The 
null hypothesis is rejected at a high level of significance (Chi-Square(2) = 12.117, p < 0.01). 
Effect size is η2 = 0.783. Mann-Whitney U test, performed on each pair of the three levels of the 
bias score, confirmed the existence of the hard-easy effect. Subjects showed significantly higher 
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overconfidence for the hard questions than for the medium (Mann-Whitney U = 0.00, p < 0.01, 
one-sided) and easy ones (Mann-Whitney U = 0.00, p < 0.01, one-sided); overconfidence for 
the medium questions was slightly higher than for the easy questions (Mann-Whitney U = 9.50, 
p < 0.1, one-sided). 
Gender Differences 
Test-50:  
Males were slightly less overconfident than females for the test-50 (men BS: M = 3.33, SD = 
5.96; women BS: M = 5.63, SD = 8.47), however this difference was not significant (t(48) = -
1.109, p = 0.27, two-sided; effect size η2 = 0.025) (see Appendix F). Male subjects achieved 
higher accuracy for the test-50 than female subjects (men: M = 78.80, SD = 5.45; women: M 
= 73.52, SD = 6.72), and this difference is significant (t(48) = 3.053, p < 0.01, two-sided). 
Effect size is η2 = 0.163, which points out that 16.3% of the variance in accuracy was gender 
dependent. Male subjects have also shown higher confidence in answering questions of test-
50, than female subjects (men: M =82.13, SD = 4.93; women: M = 79.07, SD = 6.70), this 
difference is found to be significant (t(48) = 1.840, p < 0.05, one-sided); effect size η2 = 
0.069. The fact that about 16% of variation in accuracy and 7% in confidence is gender 
dependent is not satisfactory because there is more gender bias in the overconfidence test than 
it was expected. Correlation between overconfidence and accuracy is strong and significant 
for both genders (men: Pearson’s Correlation (23) = -0.630, p < 0.01, one-sided; women: 
Pearson’s Correlation (23) = -0.625, p < 0.01, one-sided).  
Test-18:  
Both genders have shown almost equal overconfidence for the test-18 (male BS: M = 14.11, 
SD = 10.70; female BS: M = 14.12, SD = 10.79; t(48) = -0.002, p = 0.998, two-sided; effect 
size η2 = 0.00) (see Appendix F). Overconfidence for the test-50 was significantly lower than 
for the test-18. Male subjects have slightly higher accomplishments in terms of accuracy than 
female subjects (men: M = 63.78, SD = 9.64; women: M = 61.78, SD = 10.43), although this 
difference is found to be insignificant (t(48) = 0.704, p = 0.485, two-sided); effect size η2 = 
0.010. Male subjects were slightly more confident in answering questions of test-18 (men: M 
= 77.40, SD = 5.21; women: M = 74.87, SD = 5.20), however this difference is insignificant 
(t(48) = 1.37, p = 0.176, two-sided); effect size η2 = 0.037. Compared to test-50, test-18 has 
very low amount of variation in confidence and accuracy that is gender dependent. Test of the 
difference in overconfidence between men and women for the three levels of question 
difficulty has shown that both groups have expressed similar biases in answering the test and 
that the encountered differences were not significant (hard questions: t(48) = 0.085, p = 0.933, 
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two-sided; medium questions: t(48) = 0.354, p = 0.725, two-sided; easy questions: t(48) = 
0.737, p = 0.465, two-sided). Correlation between overconfidence and accuracy is strong and 
significant for both genders (men: Pearson’s Correlation (23) = -0.847, p < 0.01, one-sided; 
women: Pearson’s Correlation (23) = -0.810, p < 0.01, one-sided). 
6 SECOND EXPERIMENT 
To check if the results obtained by using test-18 were replicable, namely the average group 
degree of overconfidence, the obtained categorization into three difficultly levels and 
controlling for gender bias, the experiment was repeated with the students of the target group: 
those enrolled into different disciplines of social sciences. In this subsection I will also 
estimate the reliability of my scale.  
A second experiment was conducted on the 14th June, 2008 at Christian-Albrechts University 
of Kiel. Subjects were given approximately 15 minutes time to fill in the final, 18 questions, 
overconfidence test (test-18) at the end of the lecture on Economics of Risk and Uncertainty. 
As in the pilot test, three monetary prizes were offered for the participants who got the most 
questions right. A total of 37 tests were completed, of them 3 had no personal information and 
were not included in the further analysis. Participants of the test aged from 22 to 31 years (M 
= 26.06, SD = 2.62), and have studied on average 9.10 semesters (SD = 2.60). Of the 34 
participants 21 were males (age: M = 25.95, SD = 2.64), and 13 were females (age: M = 
26.23, SD = 2.68). The majority of the subjects were Germans (86%). All participants were 
students of social sciences, of them 26 studied economics, seven studied management, and 
one other social sciences. For information about subjects’ age and duration of studies refer to 
Appendix E. Consistent with previous research, on average, subjects were prone to 
overconfidence (M = 10.41, SD = 9.26). Average group overconfidence on test-18 obtained 
from the experiment on the 6th, June and on the 19th, May did not significantly differ from 
each other (t(82) = 1.649, p = 0.103, two-sided; size effect η2 = 0.032). Men on average were 
slightly more overconfident (M = 10.68, SD = 9.81) than women (M = 9.98, SD = 8.68), 
however this difference was found to be insignificant. Appendix G presents data on the bias 
score of all participants who took part in the pilot, and men and women separately. Just as in 
the pilot test, correlation coefficient between age and overconfidence (Pearson coefficient 
(32) = 0.189, p = 0.142, one-sided), and semester and overconfidence (Pearson coefficient 
(32) = -0.054, p = 0.388, one-sided) is small and insignificant. Correlation between the 
accuracy and the bias score is strong and significant, pointing at the decrease in 
overconfidence with the increase in accuracy (Pearson correlation (332) = -0.731, p < 0.01). 
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After division of questions into three difficulty levels characteristics of each category, in 
terms of confidence, accuracy and the bias score, were calculated (see Table 2). 
Table 2: Characteristics of the three levels of question difficulty of the test-18 from the 
experiment on 14.06.09 
 
 
Accuracy 
Subjects’ average accuracy level for answering hard questions was 22.35%, 52.94% for 
medium and 95.38% for easy questions. Kruskal-Wallis H Test shows that the difficulty level 
of questions had significant impact on the accuracy of answers (Chi-Square (2) = 15.065, p < 
0.01, one-sided); effect size η2 = 0.920. Pairwise comparisons, performed using the Mann-
Whitney U test, revealed that the accuracy for answering the medium difficulty questions 
significantly exceeds the accuracy for answering hard questions (U = 0.50, p < 0.01, one-
sided); accuracy for answering easy questions significantly exceeds accuracy for medium 
questions (U = 0.00, p < 0.01, one-sided) and hard questions (U = 0.00, p < 0.01, one-sided). 
Confidence 
On average subjects had the most confidence for answering easy questions 93.52% (SD = 
8.74); confidence levels for the hard and medium difficulty questions were correspondingly 
55.75% (SD = 7.67) and 53.95% (SD = 11.67). The Kruskal-Wallis H Test demonstrated that 
the three difficulty levels differed significantly from each other with regard to confidence 
(Chi-Square (2 ) = 12.158, p < 0.01, one-sided) (see Appendix G). Effect size is η2 = 0.824, 
which means that 82% of the variance in confidence assessments is due to the difficulty of 
questions. Pairwise comparison revealed that the confidence for easy questions was 
significantly higher than the confidence for medium and hard questions (both: Mann-Whitney U 
= 0.00, p < 0.01, one-sided); however there was no significant difference in the confidence 
levels for the hard and medium questions (Mann-Whitney U = 15.00, p = 1.00, two-sided). 
Hard Medium Easy   
  M SD M SD M SD 
Accuracy 22.35 12.06 52.94 9.49 95.38 7.76 
Confidence 55.75 7.67 53.95 11.67 93.52 8.74 
BS 33.40 19.24 1.01 11.38 -1.86 2.42 
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Overconfidence 
The overconfidence level for the hard questions was the highest (M = 33.40, SD = 19.24), the 
medium difficulty questions produced almost no overconfidence (M = 1.01, SD = 11.38), 
whereas easy questions resulted on average in underconfidence (M = -1.86, SD = 2.42). The 
three difficulty levels of questions differed significantly in terms of the produced bias score 
(Chi-Square (2) = 9.079, p < 0.01, one-sided), size effect η2 = 0.659. Mann-Whitney U 
analysis showed subjects showed significantly higher overconfidence for the hard questions 
than for the medium (Mann-Whitney U = 2.00, p < 0.01) and easy questions (Mann-Whitney 
U = 0.00, p < 0.01), which is in line with the previous research. Overconfidence levels for 
medium and easy questions, on average, were not significantly different from each other 
(Mann-Whitney U = 18.00, p = 0.334, one-sided). The bias score for the hard questions was 
significantly higher than zero (Wilcoxon Signed Rank T = 2.097, p < 0.05, one-sided); for the 
easy and medium difficulty questions the null hypothesis of the equality of the bias score to 
zero cannot be rejected (easy questions: Wilcoxon Signed Rank T = 1.606, p = 0.108, two-
sided; medium questions: Wilcoxon Signed Rank T = 0.00, p = 1.00, two-sided). For this 
group of the participants, easy and medium difficulty questions produced on average the bias 
score which was the most indistinguishable from the perfect calibration score of zero.  
Gender differences 
No significant difference between male and female participants in terms of overconfidence 
was found (t(32) = 0.211, p = 0.834, two-sided; effect size η2 = 0.001) (see Appendix G). 
Although men, on average, were less accurate than women this difference is not significant 
(t(32) = -0.524, p = 0.604, two-sided; effect size η2 = 0.009). The difference in average 
confidence across all items of the test between male and female participants is insignificant 
(t(32) = -0.53, p = 0.600, two-sided; effect size is η2 = 0.009). No significant difference in 
overconfidence is found between male and female subjects for the three levels of question 
difficulty (hard questions: t(32) = 0.042, p = 0.967, two-sided; medium questions: t(32) = -
0.357, p = 0.723, two-sided; easy questions: t(32) = 1.468, p = 0.152, two-sided). Correlation 
between overconfidence and accuracy is strong and significant for both genders (men: 
Pearson’s Correlation (19) = -0.653, p < 0.01, one-sided; women: Pearson’s Correlation (11) 
= -0.883, p < 0.01, one-sided).  
Reliability 
According to DeCoster (2000), a scale can be called reliable (possess internal consistency) “if 
repeated measurements under the same circumstances tend to produce the same results”. A 
common way to estimate reliability of an instrument is to calculate Cronbach’s alpha. Moss et 
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al (1993) state, that a generally acceptable value of coefficient alpha equals 0.6; however the 
more recognized threshold is 0.7. These values of alpha are considered to be optimal for the 
use in social research. For my instrument three values of alpha were estimated: alpha for the 
test confidence equaled 0.79, alpha for the test accuracy – 0.54, and alpha for the bias score – 
0.68. Values of the calculated alphas were either close or exceeded the threshold values. A 
somewhat lower degree of alpha for the accuracy dimension resulted from low variance in 
answering easy questions. Easy questions cannot be removed from the test, in the desire to 
improve its reliability, as a good instrument should not only have a reasonable internal 
consistency (reliability) but also a “meaningful content coverage” (Schmitt, 1996). Based, on 
the calculated values of Cronbach’s alpha, it can be concluded that the developed instrument 
possesses good internal consistency (reliability).  
7 CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper results of the two experiments, aimed at the development of the instrument (test) 
that would enable the construction of the comprehensive measure of individual 
overconfidence, are presented. Desired instrument, which is to be used in economic 
overconfidence experiments, should allow assessment of the differences between the subjects 
with respect to their degree of overconfidence and minimize the measurement error.  
After carrying out the analysis of some of the instruments used in foregoing experimental 
research, there were good reasons to suspect that overconfidence was previously measured 
inadequately. The principal steps needed to improve the instrument (test) were: 1) choice of 
another test-format (multiple choice discrete propositions’ tasks instead of confidence 
intervals estimation), 2) balancing the test for the hard-easy effect, and 3) controlling for 
gender and country bias. Instrument was obtained in a two-stage procedure in which a pilot 
test was used to assess questions’ difficulty, based on the groups’ accuracy in answering each 
of the initial 50 items. Then six questions of the three difficulty types (hard, medium, and 
easy) were selected for the final test. The second experimental phase was aimed at verification 
of replicability of results, namely of the average degree of group overconfidence, the obtained 
categorization into three difficultly levels and of controlling for the gender bias. Both 
experiments were conducted with the students enrolled into different disciplines of social 
sciences. The two experimental sessions were administered and subjects were offered a 
reward, on the basis of competition in test accuracy. As in previous experimental work, 
subjects on average proved to be overconfident. 
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Evidence was found for the significant effect of the question difficulty on the overconfidence 
measure and for the existence of the gender bias. Hard questions produced significantly 
higher levels of overconfidence than medium-difficulty and easy questions, which in turn 
resulted in underconfidence. Analysis of the groups’ accuracy on answering initial test (test-
50) revealed that even 72 percent of the questions fell in the category of easy questions. Thus, 
by using initial test-50 to measure subjects’ overconfidence, one would artificially create high 
levels of underconfidence in ones subjects. Statistical analysis confirmed that in both 
experimental sessions the three types of questions, that comprised the final test, significantly 
differed from each other in terms of the produced confidence, accuracy and overconfidence. 
This result verified the success of categorization of questions into three levels of difficulty in 
the overconfidence measurement instrument. Average group overconfidence measures on 
test-18, obtained from both experimental sessions, did not differ significantly from each other. 
Instrument’s internal consistency (reliability), assessed as the value of the Cronbach’s alpha, 
was found to be good and acceptable for the use in social research.  
Combining all levels of questions’ difficulty, both genders expressed overconfidence that did 
not differ significantly from each other. It can be concluded, that for the created instrument 
(test-18), gender is not associated with overconfidence: first, there were no significant 
differences between male and female subjects’ bias scores and, second, no significant 
difference in overconfidence was found between male and female subjects for the three levels 
of question difficulty. There was also almost no variance in confidence and accuracy that was 
gender dependent. By contrast, for the initial instrument (test-50) as much as 16 percent of 
variance in accuracy and 7 percent of variance in confidence was explained by gender.  
Based on the analysis of the data obtained from both phases of the instrument construction, 
and in the light of the importance of employment of a reliable measure to assess subjects’ 
overconfidence for the validity of the results of economic experiments, it can be concluded 
that a better instrument was developed for the use in planned experiments, suitable for 
evaluation of individual differences in terms of the degree of overconfidence.  
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APPENDIX A:  
a: Skewness of the accuracy parameters and overconfidence scores per question for the test-50 
 
  Accuracy BS 
N  50 50 
Skewness -1.310 1.855 
Std. err. of skewness 0.337 0.337 
Range 92.00 91.40 
Min 8.00 -22.80 
Max 100.00 68.60 
Percentiles:                    25  63.50 -4.60 
                                      50  84.00 -1.10 
                                      75  94.50 11.60 
 
 
b: Comparison of test-50 and test-18 in terms of overconfidence 
 
  BS50 BS18 
N  50 50 
Mean 4.47 14.11 
SD 7.34 10.63 
Skewness 0.726 0.525 
Std. err. of skewness 0.337 0.337 
Range 38.60 47.23 
Min -10.40 -5.56 
Max 28.20 41.67 
Percentiles:                 25 0.35 7.54 
                50 3.70 11.95 
                75 9.60 20.70 
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APPENDIX B: SCATTERGRAMS OF THE EXPERIENCE MEASURES RELATIONSHIP TO 
OVERCONFIDENCE (a. test-50 and test-18 age vs. bias score, and b. test-50 and test-18 semester 
vs. bias score). 
a.
b. 
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APPENDIX C: PEARSON’S TEST (DF. = 48) FOR CORRELATION RESULTS 
   Semester Age 
Correlation Coefficient -0.045 0.148 
OVE50 
Sig. (one-sided) 0.377 0.152 
Correlation Coefficient 0.078 0.194 
OVE18 
Sig. (one-sided) 0.312 0.088 
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APPENDIX D: AGE AND STUDY DURATION INFORMATION OF THE PILOT TEST ON 19.05.2008 
 
 N M SD Min Max 
Age 50 24.32 2.20 20 29 
Male age 25 24.48 2.43 20 29 
Female age 25 24.16 1.97 21 27 
Semester 50 6.98 2.11 3 11 
Male semester 25 7.00 2.27 3 11 
Female semester 25 6.96 1.99 4 11 
 
APPENDIX E: AGE AND STUDY DURATION INFORMATION OF THE PILOT TEST ON 14.06.2008 
 
 N M SD Min Max 
Age 34 26.06 2.62 22 31 
Male age 21 25.95 2.64 22 31 
Female age 13 26.23 2.68 22 30 
Semester 30 9.10 2.60 4 15 
Male semester 20 9.10 2.97 4 15 
Female semester 10 9.10 1.79 6 11 
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APPENDIX F: INFORMATION ON OVERCONFIDENCE AND ACCURACY OF THE PARTICIPANTS OF 
PILOT ON 19.05.2008 
Overconfidence 
Pilot Test 50 
OBS Group Mean SD Mini Max 
50 All 4.48 7.34 -10.40 28.20 
25 Female 5.63 8.47 -8.40 28.20 
25 Male 3.33 5.96 -10.40 13.00 
-2.298 
 
Male vs. female 
diff. (0.273) 
   
Pilot Test 18 
OBS Group Mean SD Min Max 
50 All 14.11 10.63 -5.56 41.67 
25 Female 14.12 10.79 -5.56 41.67 
25 Male 14.11 10.70 -3.89 36.11 
-0.007 
 
Male vs. female 
diff. (0.998) 
   
 
40 
APPENDIX F - CONTINUATION: 
Accuracy 
Pilot Test 50 
OBS Group Mean SD Min Max 
50 All 76.16 6.61 58 90 
25 Female 73.52 6.72 58 84 
25 Male 78.80 5.45 66 90 
5.28 
  
Male vs. female 
diff. (0.004) 
   
Pilot Test 18 
OBS Group Mean SD Min Max 
50 All 62.78 9.99 38.89 83.33 
25 Female 61.78 10.43 38.89 77.78 
25 Male 63.78 9.64 44.44 83.33 
2.00 
 
Male vs. female 
diff. (0.485) 
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APPENDIX G: INFORMATION ON OVERCONFIDENCE AND ACCURACY OF THE PARTICIPANTS OF 
PILOT ON 14.06.2008 
Overconfidence 
OBS Group M SD Min Max 
34 All 10.41 9.26 -6.28 30.00 
13 Female 9.98 8.68 -3.44 28.94 
21 Male 10.68 9.81 -6.28 30.00 
0.700 
  
Male vs. female 
diff. (0.604) 
      
 
Accuracy 
OBS Group M SD Min Max 
34 All 60.46 9.35 38.89 77.78 
13 Female 61.54 9.48 38.89 77.78 
21 Male 59.79 9.45 38.89 77.78 
-1.750 
  
Male vs. female 
diff.  (0.834) 
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APPENDIX H: TRANSLATION OF TEST-18 
General Knowledge Questionnaire  
Below you will be presented with some general knowledge questions. Imagine that you are 
taking part in a game, like “Trivial Pursuit” or “Who wants to be a Millionaire?”, and you 
have to choose the correct answer from the three given alternatives. A person who answers 
the most questions right will get a 30 EUR prize. The second place will be awarded by the 20 
EUR prize, and the third place by 10 EUR. You will be paid next week! 
1) Please circle ONLY ONE of three given answers. Only one of them is correct.  
2) When you have made your choice and have circled your answer, we would like to 
know how sure/confident you are that your answer is correct. Since there are three 
alternative answers and only one of them is correct you have a 33% chance of giving a 
correct answer. Therefore 33% means that you are guessing and do not know the 
correct answer, and 100% corresponds to absolute certainty. 
You can use any number between 33% and 100% to indicate your confidence that 
your answer is correct.  
Enter your confidence for every answer in the gap in the question after every test item:  
How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
Please answer all questions. Even if you have to guess everything, you could answer 33% 
correct by chance. You are not allowed to consult anyone else, or copy the answers from 
somebody. 
NOTE: Please answer all questions, one after another in order in which they are presented in 
the questionnaire. Guess any answers you do not know. Do not jump around the questions, 
and do not return to already answered questions to change your answers; we are interested in 
your first answer. 
You will be paid the money only if you have filled in the WHOLE questionnaire! Don’t leave 
unanswered questions or unfilled gaps! 
Please ask questions if something is unclear to you. 
Thank you for your patience in completing this questionnaire. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Your personal data will be treated confidentially. 
Surname, Name: ____________________________________________ 
Gender: ___________________________________________________ 
Age:_______________________________________________________ 
Nationality:_________________________________________________ 
Field of Study:_______________________________________________ 
Semester:____________________________________________________ 
 
Would you like to participate in another experiment, in which you can also win money? 
Yes  
E-Mail: _________________________________________________________ 
 
No  
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1. How does one still call an instant camera? (circle one)  
Canon camera   Polaroid camera   Minolta camera  
  
How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
 
  
2. Where do flounders mostly live? (circle one)  
in coral reef               dug on the ground     in the reed  
  
How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
 
  
3. What does the rollmops consist of? (circle one)  
herring filet                              pork                          salmon filet 
  
How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
 
 
4. Which land does the Nobel Prize winner in Literature Gabriel García Márquez 
come from? (circle one)  
Colombia                 Spain    Venezuela  
  
How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
 
 
5. Which style movement does anacreontics belong to? (circle one)  
Rococo    Romanticism   Realism  
  
How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
 
 
6. What is a hot chili sauce? (circle one)  
Tabasco               Curacao                 Macao  
 How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
 
 
7. How many letters does the Russian alphabet consist of? (circle one)  
40  33                  26  
  
How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
 
 
8. "Tosca" is an opera from ...? (circle one)  
G. Puccini    G. Verdi     A. Vivaldi  
  
How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
 
 
9. What s the name of the Greek Goddess of wisdom? (circle one)  
Pallas Athena      Nike                  Penelope  
  
How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
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10. Which is the most abundant metal on the Earth? (circle one)  
iron               aluminum    copper  
 How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
 
 
11. How does one call an unknowing person? (circle one)  
Ignatius   ignorant    ideologue  
 How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
 
 
12. Who flew for the first time with an airship around the Eiffel Tower? (circle one)  
Santos-Dumont   count Zeppelin    Saint-Exupéry  
 How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
 
 
13. How is the snow shelter of Eskimos called? (circle one)  
wigwam               igloo                 tipi 
 How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
 
 
14. Which enterprise does Bill Gates belong to? (circle one)  
Intel                Microsoft     Dell Computers  
 How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
 
 
15. How is the fasting month in Islam called? (circle one)  
Sharia               Ramadan                Imam  
 How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
 
 
16. Which language does the concept "Fata Morgana" come from? (circle one)  
Italian                Arabic     Swahili  
 How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
 
 
 
 
17. How many days does a hen need to incubate an egg? (circle one)  
21 day     14 days     28 days  
 
 How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
 
 
18. What is ascorbic acid? (circle one)  
apple vinegar               vitamin C               vitamin A  
 
 How confident are you that your answer is correct? _______ %  
 
